In the July/August issue of Intereconomics, Silke Tober criticised a proposal put forth by Andrew Watt to solve the euro crisis through the use of monetary fi nancing of the public sector. Tober argued that there are valid reasons to keep monetary and fi scal policy separate from one another and that Watt's proposal blurred the line between the two policy areas. Here, Watt responds to his critic, followed by a reply from Tober.
This note seeks to correct misperceptions and thus reopen a debate on a possible role for monetary fi nancing.
A free lunch? Answering the wrong question
The COMFOPI proposal is explicitly aimed at offering a pathway out of the crisis of high public debt, defl ation (or stubbornly below-target infl ation), low growth and high unemployment, given the current economic, political and legal conditions prevailing in Europe and especially within the eurozone. Assuming that there is consensus that such a pathway is indeed to be sought, a sensible critique of my proposal could attempt a number of things. It could show that the proposal will not generate the postulated positive effects if it were to be implemented. It could seek to demonstrate that it cannot for some reason be implemented. Or it could point to an alternative pathway that is (more) politically viable and/or will generate better outcomes.
Instead, the critique focuses, for reasons that are not explained, on the issue of whether COMFOPI constitutes a "free lunch". The rhetorical question is in the title, the headline of the main section and the critique's conclusion. Yet, this can clearly not be the key issue. Even if a critic successfully managed to demonstrate that monetary fi nancing in this form is not a free lunch (whatever that means concretely), the appropriate response would be "So what?". The costs to the central bank or to any government of a scheme could be very large, yet if this were the best (not to mention the only) way to exit a stubborn slump and move towards full employment and stable growth, the proposal should be championed, not rubbished. The benchmark ought to be whether the proposal There has been a recent fl urry of academic and more policy-oriented articles dealing with monetary fi nancing, i.e. the provision of central bank money to fi nance expansionary fi scal policy: tax cuts, transfers to households or public investment. As part of this debate, and against the background of the persistent inability of the euro area economy to emerge from the crisis, early this year I made a proposal for a specifi c form of monetary financing of public investment via European Central Bank (ECB) purchases, on secondary markets, of bonds issued by the European Investment Bank (EIB). This proposal -dubbed COMFOPI, conditional overt monetary fi nancing of public investment -was published as IMK Working Paper 148.
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One of the purposes of the article was to stimulate a debate on the scope for monetary fi nancing in general and the specifi c proposal. In that sense, the publishing of a critique of my article by Silke Tober in Intereconomics is welcome.
2 Unfortunately, however, this critique focuses on a side issue -whether monetary fi nancing is a "free lunch". It contains a number of misrepresentations and does not engage with the literature on the subject of monetary fi nancing in which my proposal is rooted. Nor does it offer an adequate appraisal of the European economic governance framework. There is a largely semantic critique of whether specifi c measures are to be con-
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how crucial it is to give the central bank the right to decide when to say no to further monetisation. It is a key feature of the proposal that it contains an explicit "trigger mechanism" which the ECB itself defi nes, precisely to ensure that its mandate cannot be called into question. This essential information is withheld from the reader, however.
Moreover, she justifi es her claim by reproducing a sentence from my text: "For instance central bank purchases could be wound down to zero over a six month period after the core infl ation rate in the euro area has exceeded 2.5% for three consecutive months." 5 First, the phrase "for instance" clearly indicates that what follows is one possible example of a suitable trigger, the precise formulation of which is not critical to the proposal. 6 Second, even taking the quoted formulation without context, her attack is surely misplaced. Monetary policy experts, not least Tober herself, 7 are at pains to emphasise the medium-term nature of the ECB's infl ation target. The risks of becoming locked into a defl ationary trap are very considerable; this is something my critic has rightly emphasised in her own work. Therefore to claim that, after a very extended period of substantially below-target infl ation, it would be to "call into question the infl ation target of the ECB" to allow (core) infl ation to run at 2.5 per cent for three months is inexplicable. I would be more than happy to see core infl ation at that level for one quarter as an indication that the euro area economy had fi nally emerged from the defl ationary trap. But in any case, it would not be for me or my critic to decide, but the ECB, which is hardly likely to call into question its own infl ation target.
Ignoring the relevant literature
The proposal contains an extended discussion of the literature relating to monetary fi nancing, including papers by leading economists and monetary theorists and central bank experts (such as Bernanke, Buiter, Gali, Goodhart, Whelan, Wren-Lewis and Woodford). 8 Tober makes no attempt to situate my proposal in the context of this literature nor engage with that literature herself and its im- generates a net social benefi t or is more or less effective than alternatives.
The chosen line of attack is all the more perplexing given that in at least four places in the original working paper it is explicitly stated that monetary fi nancing does imply losses. 3 The point is made, however, that these losses take the form of additional infl ation. This is normally undesirable, functioning as a sort of tax on private sector agents and potentially posing serious stability risks. This is whyas discussed in the article, but not referenced by Tober -it is generally right to impose limits on monetary fi nancing. In the specifi c context of defl ation or excessively low infl ation, though, higher infl ation is not a bug but a feature of the proposal.
Ignoring the relevant and bringing in irrelevant context
This brings us to a second, related shortcoming. The original article goes out of its way to emphasise the specifi c nature of the current defl ationary environment, in which the European Central Bank is desperately seeking, most recently by means of substantial quantitative easing measures, to raise the rate of infl ation to meet its target. There is a discussion of Japan's long stagnation and the lessons drawn from it by former US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. By contrast, the critique does not refer to Japan at all and to defl ation just once (in passing in a footnote near the end of the text). On the other hand, it does refer to Weimar and remind us that "history is littered with examples of governments using the central bank to fi nance public expenditure (…) More often than not the result was spiralling infl ation".
True, but irrelevant. The critique fails to take on board that the proposal is designed for and -a point to which I now turn -is explicitly limited to a specifi c historical context.
Serious misrepresentation of a key argument
Ms. Tober writes that my proposal "calls in question the infl ation target of the ECB", going on to explain that "[t]he monetary fi nancing is supposed to continue even when infl ation overshoots the ECB target of about 1.9 per cent".
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Bookkeeping losses to the central bank are likely to occur in the case of the QE programme because the central bank buys assets when interest rates are low (and prices are high) and may well sell them back to the private sector when the economy recovers and interest rates rise (and thus prices are lower). As Wren-Lewis has argued, once you support QE, it does not make sense to reject monetary fi nancing on the grounds that it leads to central bank losses.
11 After all, in Friedman's original thought experiment, monetary fi nancing takes the form of tossing bank notes out of a helicopter. There is no immediate balancesheet counterpart but a reduction in the future stream of seignorage income. As already pointed out, the "cost" of this is the debasement of money; but as long as infl ation is stuck below its target level, this is a feature not a bug.
The key point is that the central bank can create base money essentially costlessly. If the EIB loans the money to the governments and the ECB takes interest-bearing debt onto its books, then we enter a circular process: governments will make debt service payments to the EIB which are used to make payments to the central bank, but these earnings are returned to governments as central bank profi ts. There may be accounting issues to be resolved here. Interest rate differentials may be relevant. This is a point on which a constructive debate is useful. But ultimately, such transfers between public sector bodies can be considered macroeconomically irrelevant, or at most a second-order issue.
Indeed, Tober seems to recognise this basic logic. However, her discussion of the issues is not always clear. As an illustration, consider the following passage:
Monetary fi nancing of public investment is not a free lunch, as contended by Watt. Although EIB-ECB financing would mean that governments do not pay interest on the funds used for public investment, the Eurosystem would not earn interest on the corresponding assets, thus generating less profi t than in the case of standard quantitative easing. Provided the ECB pursues its infl ation target, the impact on the fi scal budget is the same whether public investment is fi nanced regularly or by the central bank.
12
The second sentence compares monetary fi nancing of public investment with QE. The third sentence compares bond-fi nanced public investment and monetary-fi nanced public investment. Regarding the second sentence, the fact that a central bank does not accrue interest income plications for her own views. 9 The COMFOPI proposal is an attempt to operationalise, within the specifi c European and contemporary context, concepts that have a wellestablished pedigree in economics, and not -whatever its possible fl aws -a dreamt-up, baseless scheme that implausibly imagines something can be got from nothing.
"Burying debt" and central bank balance sheets I criticised above the undue focus on the implications of monetary fi nancing for central bank balance sheets for being a side issue by which to evaluate the proposal. It is nonetheless worth looking at this critique in its own terms. For this, we need to get to the nuts and bolts of the proposal. The original proposal was arguably lacking in precision here, and several alternatives were discussed which probably did not aid the clarity of exposition. Constructive criticisms and suggestions are helpful.
Let us start with a simple case in which the EIB gives the money it has received from the private sector as a grant to member state governments and the EIB bonds purchased by the ECB sit on its balance sheet (i.e. are "buried") as worthless perpetual zero interest bonds. (This is also at the heart of a separate proposal, by Pâris and Wyplosz, 10 that Tober also reviews unfavourably.) The question is whether this is in any real economic sense a loss or a problem for the central bank. In my critic's view, it is both.
But the question is whether these losses, which indisputably exist in a bookkeeping sense, have any meaning in an economic sense. Many leading monetary authorities (cited in my working paper) argue that it is not. These experts do not see a notable impairment to the operation of the central bank from accounting losses. 9 My critic fi nds one quote from Wren-Lewis that, taken out of context, appears to suggest that he is opposed to the mixing up of fi scal and monetary policy implied by "helicopter money" (see S. To b e r : Monetary Financing…, op. cit., p. 218). In fact, Wren-Lewis -one of the UK's leading macroeconomists and long an advisor to the Bank of England and British Treasury -has intensively discussed and is broadly in favour of helicopter money (monetary fi nancing), when responsibly pursued in defl ationary circumstances. Among other things, he is a signatory of a Financial Times letter explicitly calling on the ECB to engage in monetary fi nancing. See Better ways to boost eurozone economy and employment, in: Financial Times, 26 March 2015. He also is on record as characterising as "misleading" the argument that monetary fi nancing mixes up fi scal and monetary policy -an argument which forms a prominent part of Tober's case against COMFO-PI. See M. B l y t h , E. L o n e r g a n , S. W r e n -L e w i s : Now the Bank of England needs to deliver QE for the people, in: The Guardian, 21 May 2015. 10 P. P â r i s , C. W y p l o s z : The PADRE plan: Politically Acceptable Debt
Restructuring in the Eurozone, VOX CEPR's Policy Portal, 28 January 2014.
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(which it would transfer to the governments) can hardly be construed as a loss or cost. Regarding the third, the whole point of the distinction between "regular" and "monetary" fi nancing of investment is that the former is not happening and, in my judgement, is regrettably not likely to happen to anything like the required extent (see next section).
Ms. Tober is correct to point out that central bank/treasury relations in the euro area are more complex than implied by the above discussion, as there is not a simple unity within one "state". For these reasons attention does need to be paid to issues of the distribution of additional spending power and subsequent debt servicing. I sketched out some alternatives in my Working Paper. In the simplest case the ECB capital key is used (as with QE), and redistribution between countries is not an issue. It could be considered to organise all the additional public investment on the EU rather than national level. This is likely to have drawbacks, though. I now think it would be preferable for the EIB money to be lent to Member State governments and for the circular interest payments to be made. This is with a view to the balance sheet of the EIB, not the ECB, however. Clearly, this requires agreement that this debt is not counted against the defi cit.
I welcome work and also criticism that helps to develop these ideas. It is true that we are in uncharted waters. The nuts and bolts of the scheme can and should be discussed.
Failure to weigh alternatives to monetary fi nancing
Tober and I are in fundamental agreement that the European economy needs a phase of highly expansionary monetary policy combined with expansionary fi scal policy, and that the latter should focus on higher public investment. The question is how to achieve that combination. My IMK working paper contains a discussion of the likelihood that policies currently on the table or under discussion -for example the Juncker Plan -can be expected to lead to a monetary-fi scal policy mix that generates sustained and sustainable economic growth and a return to price stability and close-to-full employment. 13 The upshot of this review, which I do not repeat here, is that it is highly unlikely. This is a judgement about future outcomes that by its very nature is uncertain and about which reasonable people may disagree (partly but not only because there is no clear benchmark for the speed and durability of recovery that would constitute policy making success). As indicated earlier, a reasonable criticism would be that this view is too pessimistic and that other measures have a reasonable chance of being implemented that would generate similar or even better economic outcomes.
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ondary market, circumventing the treaty ban on fi nancing government defi cits. A political decision to engage in monetary fi nancing could, I would argue, be easier to realise than solving the thorny collective action problems needed to permit fi scal expansion.
Whatever view one takes here, the key fact is that any effective remedy will come up against the inadequate legal framework of the euro area and/or the constraints foolishly written into national law. Something has to give! These issues need to be weighed in a balanced way -and further work will need to be done by legal scholars.
Similarly, the original paper discusses the risks of relying heavily on QE (at the time of writing the proposal, the QE programme was just getting under way). 17 The risks include distributional outcomes (which may have knock-on effects for the sustainability of growth) and risks to fi nancial stability. In evaluating the COMFOPI proposal, one should surely consider the possible risks of alternatives like relying on QE.
Conclusion
A debate in Europe is urgently needed about how to emerge from economic stagnation, high unemployment, public debt and the threat of defl ation. Certainly there is no silver bullet. The COMFOPI proposal is potentially a building block in that debate. Contributions that seriously engage with the issues and that develop alternatives, even imperfect ones, and offer constructive criticism that moves the debate forward are welcome. What should be avoided is to close down, without proper and balanced refl ection, potentially interesting avenues for policy development, leaving Europe exposed, with an inadequate policy framework, to major risks of underperformance and longer-term stagnation.
17 A. W a t t , op. cit., p. 11.
Clearly, such a line of argument would not make COM-FOPI bad policy nor justify its out-of-hand rejection. One could, for instance, suggest that it be refi ned and elaborated further for the event that the existing QE programme does not deliver the hoped for results.
But my critic has not weighed fairly the pros and cons, the risks and rewards of possible alternatives. Rather, she claims that in order to fi nance public investment, "fi scal defi cits could be increased even in those countries that currently are said not to have fi scal space" because the euro area is "obviously in an unexpected adverse economic situation".
14 While this is a comforting view, she quotes no literature to support it. More pertinently, unfortunately it is not obious that those institutions with actual powers over the matter take this view. It also ignores the fact that euro area countries have all introduced balanced budget rules (i.e. debt brakes) which, while their details vary, have in common that they do not make a golden-rule-type exception for public investment. Surely the dramatic austerity of recent years and the massive fall in public investment as a share of GDP is rather diffi cult to explain if it were really the case that countries "not thought" to have fi scal space could simply point to the adverse economic situation and ramp up public investment.
What is certainly conceivable -and this is discussed in the original article 15 -is that the existing fi scal rules are set aside on an ad hoc or even a more permanent basis. A little fi scal relief may be forthcoming in this way. One needs to be clear, though, that a substantial and lasting easing would be a transgression of primary EU law and also of many national laws (often of constitutional rank). I would argue that this is substantially more diffi cult than fi nding a "fudge" 16 to enable ECB purchases on the sec-
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ward: the European Central Bank (ECB) promises to buy newly issued bonds from the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the magnitude of €750 billion over a period of fi ve years. This promise allows the EIB to raise its loan volume by 175 per cent without increasing its capital or losing its triple-A rating. The money thus obtained by the EIB is transferred to the member states, which use it to raise public investment.
The "free lunch" dimension of the EIB-ECB plan -echoed in the title of "Monetary Financing in the Euro Area: A Free Lunch?" 2 -is not as peripheral to the scheme as Watt makes it out to be in his reply.
3 Indeed, it is an important part of the narrative. At its core lies the idea that public debt transferred to the ECB "might as well be extinguished". 4 The only "cost" is higher infl ation, which in the current situation "is a boon not a bug of the scheme". 5 ECB-fi nanced public investment "is not just a free lunch, it is a meal that diners are being paid to eat". 6 Lack of cost is an essential element, because it underlies the claim that higher public investment in this scheme does not entail higher fi scal defi cits or higher public debt.
Contrary to Watt's assertion, however, higher infl ation does not represent the costs of increased public investment in this scheme. Instead, the costs are the opportunity costs that arise because non-interest-bearing EIB bonds take the place of interest-bearing debt on the balance sheets of the Eurosystem. For the ECB, faced with a longer-term low infl ation outlook and subdued infl ation expectations, the alternative to monetary fi nancing is not inactivity but rather other forms of monetary expansion, such as quantitative easing. Monetary fi nancing as proposed in Watt's scheme does not affect the amount of asset purchases by the Eurosystem but only their composition. Substituting non-interest-bearing bonds for interest-bearing bonds reduces central bank profi ts and thus negatively impacts on national fi scal balances. Except for possible differences in interest rates, the fi scal impact is therefore the same, regardless of whether public investment is fi nanced by credit or by newly issued bonds monetised by the central bank.
Analogously, public debt does not disappear once transferred to the Eurosystem. It is important to bear in mind that central banks have to be able to reverse or neutralise any monetary policy operation to maintain price stability. Once the economic situation normalises, the currently high level of liquidity may not be needed anymore. To absorb excess liquidity, a central bank that monetised debt might have to issue interest-bearing debt certifi cates rather than being able to sell the bonds it bought while engaging in quantitative easing. Shifting debt to the Eurosystem does not make it disappear but instead reduces the central bank's net assets.
The upshot of my reasoning above is that the analysis of the costs of monetary fi nancing is logically fl awed in Watt's scheme -a fl aw not shared by Pâris/Wyplosz. 7 The only "benefi t" of the scheme is that there is a chance that the higher public debt may be effectively hidden and therefore not subject to the stringent fi scal rules in the euro area.
Contrary to Watt's assertion, Bernanke provides no theoretical backing for Watt's scheme either. 8 In his analysis of Japan, Bernanke was dealing with the problem of Ricardian equivalence, which renders fi scal policy ineffective because economic agents anticipate future tax burdens as a result of defi cit spending and reduce current consumption accordingly. Bernanke's recommendation is quantitative easing, as already practiced by the ECB, combined with price level targeting and expansionary fi scal policy. In addition, Bernanke proposes measures to protect the central bank's balance sheet by transferring risk to the national ministry of fi nance, not the other way around as in Watt. 9 Watt's scheme, on the other hand, attempts to get around the very different problem that policy makers in the euro area are not willing to increase defi cit spending or change the fi scal rules they themselves legislated.
As a side issue, Watt reaffi rms his view that it is compatible with the ECB's infl ation target to continue expanding its balance sheet for six months after core infl ation has exceeded "2.5% for three consecutive months". 10 I disa-
